DR. FRIEDEN CONTINUES:

Third and finally, I’d like to discuss some breaking news with the vials of smallpox found on the campus of the NIH in Maryland. NIH moved swiftly to make sure that the specimens were secure and expert staff at CDC along with federal partners quickly secured and retrieved the specimens and transported them earlier this week here in Atlanta. There was no risk to workers or to the public, but this event also should never have happened. My understanding is that NIH will scour their entire campus to see if there are any other stray materials that shouldn't be present, and CDC, which has a regulatory function in this area, will monitor their progress and completion in doing this. CDC scientists worked rapidly to analyze the contents of the six vials labeled as variola, the smallpox virus. First they did what’s called PCR, a chain reaction to see if there was DNA from smallpox there. And yes, in fact, there was. That told us that smallpox had had been present in those vials, but it didn't tell us if it was what we call viable, or alive. That requires putting it into a tissue culture and seeing if it grows, then repeating that test to see if the number of organisms is increasing.

Smallpox vials should have been destroyed decades ago

On Monday night, they worked through the night to confirm that the DNA was present by PCR testing, they then injected the material into special materials to see if it was alive. And yesterday we learned that two of the six vials showed evidence of growth. Our scientists again repeated the PCR testing and determined that the growth is indeed smallpox virus. This is growing in our approved smallpox containment laboratory, a BSL-4 facility. We've already begun the process of analyzing the entire genetic sequence of the smallpox virus, and we'll see whether any of the remaining four vials grow. Something that may take up to two weeks. After we've monitored growth and sequenced the genome, we will destroy the vials and all of the culture material from these materials. That's what should have been done a couple of decades ago, and that's what will be done now, and we've invited representatives from the World Health Organization will witness that destruction. Whoever created these vials didn't do so out of malice. In fact, they come with the date of February 10th of 1954. That's when they were created. That was before smallpox eradication. In fact, that's before smallpox eradication was undertaken.

The problem was not in the creation of the materials but in the inventory control which allowed them to remain unsecured for decades. They should have been destroyed decades ago, and once we complete the work here, we will destroy them. I’ll end today's briefing by reiterating an important point I started with. The American people depend on CDC to work 24/7 to protect their health. They also expect us to adhere to the highest standards possible. And I expect that as well. Because our scientists and our laboratories are national treasures, all of us at CDC share a responsibility to make sure that we do everything possible to make sure our staff  are safe when they do their work. That's why events like this should never happen, and that's why I will do everything in my power to make sure that nothing like this happens again. Thank you very much. And I’ll be happy to answer questions. We've got a lot of people on the phone. So we'll be going back and forth between the phone and the room.

JOHN ROBERTS: Yes, Dr. Frieden, your report details that there was a similar incident involving the bioterror rapid response lab and anthrax in 2006. My question is what were the security protocols that were put in place following that?  And were those protocols followed?  You'd think if you had a similar incident in 2006, you wouldn't be in the position that you find yourself in today.

TOM FRIEDEN: Our report outlines all prior incidents that we're currently aware of dangerous pathogens leaving a CDC lab when they shouldn't have left a CDC laboratory. One of those incidents was in 2006 from the same laboratory that was involved in the anthrax work that we described now. My understanding is that the staff were not the same staff at that time. But after the 2006 episode, what they did was implement a procedure for one particular type of specimen. If they had used that particular procedure for this type of specimen, then it would not have happened. So the procedure that they put in place in 2006 was appropriate, but they didn't go deep enough in terms of outlining, all right, how do we make sure if this had happened, that we don't just prevent this but everything like this from happening in that laboratory. Let's go to the phone.

OPERATOR: On the phone lines if you'd like to ask a question, just press star-1 at this time. And we do have a question from Miriam Falco with CNN. You may ask your question.

MIRIAM FALCO: Hi, Dr. Frieden. Thank you for taking these questions. So much you've covered, I’ll ask you one question. Why did it take so long for the second incident that you've described to be revealed?  And how many lab folks at CDC employees are being tested or are concerned about possible exposure to this H5N1 mixed with a more easily transmissible flu, I presume? 

TOM FRIEDEN: At this point everything we've looked at strongly suggests that there was no exposure of anyone to influenza in the second incident that I described. The people who were involved were wearing what are called “PAPRs” or positive air pressure respirators. They were working in an enhanced BSL-3 facilities. So multiple redundant checks to prevent infection with flu. So we do not think there was a human exposure there. As to why it took six weeks for that to be made apparent to us, I can think of no valid explanation. Next question on the phone.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Next question comes from Mike Stobbe with the Associated Press. You may ask your question.

MIKE STOBBE: Thank you. So many questions I’d like to ask. If I could start, doctor, you said that the flu incident was the most distressing. Do you mind clarifying why and also addressing -- did the sample end up mutating or changing as a result of -- is there some ongoing concern regarding the results of that cross-contamination? 

TOM FRIEDEN: Thank you. I’m really glad you asked that. It's most distressing not because it's most dangerous. Everything we know today suggests there was no human exposure. The materials are all either destroyed or contained, and there's no risk from it. What's distressing about it are two things, really. First, our influenza laboratory is a superb laboratory. We have wonderful laboratory scientists in that laboratory and throughout CDC. So to me, the fact that something like this could happen in such a superb laboratory is unsettling because it tells me that we need to look at our culture of safety throughout all of our laboratories. Second is deeply troubling that there was what is an unacceptable delay in providing this information. It's very important to have a culture of safety that says if you've got a problem, talk about it. The biggest way to get into more trouble is not to talk about something when you've got a problem. So that kind of delay is very troubling. And I know it's very troubling to the people who oversee that unit as well and very unexpected. So we will do a full investigation to understand the causes of it. Again, we just learned about it within the last couple of days. We're confident of the containment, but the causes of it and the actions that we'll take as response are going to take some time.

MIKE STOBBE: And could you say how many BSL-3 and -4 labs there are, and are they all in Atlanta, or where are they? 

TOM FRIEDEN: CDC has many biocontainment laboratories. How you count them depends on whether you're talking about rooms or investigators. We have laboratories here at the Atlanta campus at Roybal, we have one BSL-3 laboratory over at the Chamblee campus, we have BSL-3 laboratories out in Fort Collins, Colorado, our vector-born program. And in case of backup, we're authorized to work in one of our Alaska laboratories that we don't have contained specimens there, but that's a backup redundant facility. Next question on the phone.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Next question comes from Lena Sun with the Washington Post. Go ahead with your question.

LENA SUN: Hi, Dr. Frieden. I guess my question is the report actually details four other incidents in addition to the last month's anthrax release. I know that you've said this, but each team there was, I guess, incident, why were there -- how could this have happened at the CDC that all these agents were released in the last decade? 

TOM FRIEDEN: I asked the same question. And it's a totally valid question. I think people have had a narrow vision of the problem. There's a problem, they fixed that problem. What the events of the past couple of months have told me is that there's a problem, and it's a symptom of a broader problem of laboratory safety. And we need to stop, reassess, fix and make sure that we do everything humanly possible to make sure that events like this never happen in the future.

LENA SUN: Do you know whether these -- in the previous incidents when those -- aside from the flu one, the other three incidents, what happened to those organisms and whether there were any exposures? 

TOM FRIEDEN: In the other incidents, from everything I understand there were no exposures, and the organisms have been completely contained. So there was no release. These are procedures in laboratory procedures. If I could talk for a minute about how to improve performance. It's very important that people understand that mistakes are human. That's why we put in systems so that if human mistakes occur, human harm will not occur. That's what redundant systems are about. And that's why it's important the staff feel comfortable coming forward if there's a problem. That's why it's important that we have protocols in place that are rigorously reviewed. One of the things that may happen -- and this is just a hypothesis -- is that when most people hear about anthrax or another deadly organism, they think, you know, this is something that is, of course, terrifying, and it is. But if you work with that organism day in and day out for days, weeks, months and years, you can get a little careless. And that's something that may have happened. And that's why Dr. Bell is going to look at every way we can to enhance the culture of safety so we have -- we're not relying on people to do the right thing, though we want them to do that, we're relying on systems so that even if someone makes a mistake, there will not be a risk to people. I’m going to go to people who haven't asked questions yet. More questions on the phone? 

OPERATOR: Thank you. Next question comes from Nancy Snyderman with NBC News.

NANCY SNYDERMAN: Dr. Frieden, you just alluded to sloppiness. Is there any common denominator as you look at this early as to whether your protocols for safety are antiquated or whether these are junior lab people who have -- don't have experience, or to the contrary, senior people who have just become lax  after years and years of being in a lab?